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ABSTRACT. Land auction is widely practiced in company and government decisions, especially in 
China. Bidders are always faced with two or more auctions in the period of a decision cycle. The 
outcome of the auction is under high risk. The bidder’s risk attitude and preference will have a great 
influence on his/her bidding price. Prospect theory is currently the main descriptive theory of deci-
sion under risk. In this paper, we will consider the preferences of the decision-makers in land bidding 
decisions with the multi-attribute additive utility and reference point method in cumulative prospect 
theory. Three land auction models are proposed based on the appearance time of the land auctions. The 
simultaneous model uses cumulative prospect theory without considering the relationships between 
the auctions. The time sequential model involves the exchange auction decisions at different time with 
the third-generation prospect theory. The event sequential model further considers the reference point 
prediction in sequential land auction decisions. The three models can help the decision-makers make 
better bidding price decision when they are faced with several land auctions in the period of a decision 
cycle. A case study illustrates the processes and results of our approaches.
KEYWORDS: Land auction; Prospect theory; The third generation of prospect theory; Additive utility; 
Reference point prediction
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1. INTRODUCTION
Land is a major factor of production for all prod-
ucts. Vacant land is traded in a market mainly by 
developers, who actively manage development risk 
for profits (Chau et al. 2010). Over the past decade, 
urban land supply in China were mainly made by 
means of auctions. The government makes an an-
nouncement about the available land to the public, 
and the land is sold to the firm who bids at the 
highest price. In the bidding process, each partici-
pant has to submit his bidding price for the land 
without knowing the others’ bidding prices (Chen, 
Fan 2008). In reality, the whole process can be 
seen as a first-price sealed auction (Vickrey 1961).
A successful contractor is the one that selects 
the most optimal bidding price which secures both 
the contract and contract profitability (Shash, Ab-
dulHadi 1992). Similarly, the successful bidder in 
land auction is the one who not only wins the land 
but also obtains the maximum value from the land 
development. An auction is a market institution 
with an explicit set of rules determining resource 
allocation and prices on the basis of bids from the 
market participants (McAfee, McMillan 1987). In 
an auction, the most important thing for market 
participants is how to make his or her bidding 
price. In this paper, we mainly consider partici-
pants’ bidding price decisions in land auctions. In 
China, government has the ownership of land, and 
the real estate company often obtain the use right 
of land with a fixed time period (usually 70 years) 
from the government through auction. With the 
fast development of land market, the land’s bidding 
prices become very high. During the last few years, 
some plots of land have been bided at very high 
prices which made these plots of land be called “Di 
Wang” (the most expensive land). With the high 
price, many real estate companies often don’t have 
enough fund to bid for many land auctions. Gener-
ally for a small real estate company it can only bid 
for one or two land auctions at a same time due to 
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its limited capital, financing condition and the high 
land bidding prices, though the government may 
launch many land auctions at a same time.
The real estate bidders are always faced with 
two or more land auctions in the period of a deci-
sion cycle. Considering the appearance time of the 
latter auction, the bidder might encounter three 
different situations: (1) The auctions appear at 
the same time and the bidder needs to decide the 
bidding prices for the auctions at the same time; 
(2) The auctions appear at different time, the latter 
auction is proposed after the bidder has won the 
former land auctions, but without knowing the de-
velopment outcomes; (3) The auctions appear at dif-
ferent time and the latter land auction is proposed 
after the bidder has won the former land auctions 
and the development outcomes of the former have 
been known. In China, generally, a small real es-
tate company can only bid for one or two land auc-
tions at a same time. Thus in this paper, the first 
and the second situations involve two land auctions 
while the third situation involves more than two 
auctions (taking four auctions as an example).
The real estate company has the desire to win 
the land and it needs to estimate the competitors’ 
bidding price, which will make the real estate com-
pany obtain the land with more possibility and at 
a relatively lower price. A scientific estimation on 
the competitors’ bidding price can help the real es-
tate company make a scientific decision of his/her 
bidding price. If the bidder can estimate his/her 
competitors’ possible bidding prices, then the bid-
der would have advantages in the auction. Thus, 
study on the bidders’ most possible bidding price 
is quite necessary.
The competitors’ bidding prices are influenced 
by many factors. Cheng et al. (2011) provided a 
summary on the most commonly used influential 
factors, such as the number of competitors, ex-
pected profitability, market condition, expected 
risk, experience in similar project. These factors 
can be divided into two categories, i.e., numerical 
factors and non-numerical factors. The numerical 
factors will be well discussed in the model, while 
the non-numerical factors are difficult to be de-
scribed directly in the model. But the non-numer-
ical factors can be included implicitly because the 
non-numerical factors would impact the numerical 
factors and the risk. For example, experience in 
similar project would influence the expected risk 
and thus influence the expected profitability, while 
market condition and expected risk would impact 
the number of competitors, expected profitability 
and the outcome risk. Additionally, the bidding 
prices are also influenced by the decision-makers’ 
irrationality and risk preference in real life.
In China, land development has the charac-
teristics of large capital requirement, relatively 
long development period and high risk of profit. 
In these high risk situations, the bidder’s ir-
rationality would play an important role in the 
bidder’s bidding price decision. Estimating the 
bidding prices the decision-makers’ irrationality 
and risk preference must be considered. However, 
traditional expected utility theory (EUT) has an 
assumption that the decision-maker is perfect 
rational, which makes the estimating based on 
traditional expected utility theory fail to describe 
the decision in real life when the decision-maker 
is not perfect rational. Actually prospect theory 
is currently the main descriptive model of deci-
sion making under uncertainty. It generalizes 
expected utility by introducing nonlinear decision 
weighting and loss aversion. Different from the 
classical theory, prospect theory adopts a concave-
shaped utility function (UF) for gains and convex 
for losses associated with an inverse S-shaped 
probability weighting function (PWF) to describe 
individual preferences in risky prospect choices. 
Both preference and risk are well considered in 
decision in prospect theory. A lot of studies have 
been conducted on prospect theory, including mul-
ti attribute and reference point prediction. With 
prospect theory we can give better explanations 
to participants’ decisions. In this paper, we would 
utilize prospect theory to give better descriptions 
of decisions in land auctions.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 
gives a review on the related literature. Section 3 
is the preliminary knowledge about prospect the-
ory and its latest developments. Section 4 propos-
es the theory which will be used in the following 
sectors to solve decision making problems in land 
auctions. Section 5 gives the solutions of three in-
dependent decision making problems in land auc-
tions using prospect theory. Section 6 summarizes 
the main conclusion of this paper.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Studies in the field of competitive bidding strategy 
models have been conducted since 1950s (Fried-
man 1956). Numerous models have been devel-
oped, some of which were designed specifically for 
bidders. In spite of the abundance of competitive 
bidding strategy models that have been developed, 
most of them were developed using game theo-
ry. However, few of them took irrationality into 
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consideration, which does affect participants’ deci-
sions under uncertainty.
Many studies about bidding price are based 
on game theory. Study on equilibrium bidding 
strategies is dated from Vickrey (1961), who ana-
lyzed the simplified English auction, Dutch auc-
tion, the first price sealed auction and the second 
price sealed auction under the condition of sym-
metrical independence private value, obtaining the 
equilibrium bidding prices for the bidders. Riley 
and Samuelson (1981) extended the conclusion of 
Vickrey (1961), obtaining the equilibrium bidding 
prices for the bidders in more general conditions. 
Myerson (1981) proposed the equilibrium bidding 
prices for the bidders in independence private 
value, from the perspective of mechanism design. 
Wilson (1977) established a general set of analysis 
methods for non-collaborate auctions, which can 
also be used in sealed bidding auctions.
As to multi-attribute auction, McAfee and Mc-
Millan (1987) proposed that the factors influencing 
bidding decision include product quality, charac-
teristics and price. Richard (1980) made similar 
comment on auctions. They established foundation 
for multi-attribute auction studies. Chen-Ritzo et 
al. (2003) and Bichler (2000) put up with the no-
tion that multi-attribute auction is more suitable 
to the bidders’ expectation by experiment. Most 
studies on multi-attribute auctions are based on 
game theory (Thiel 1988; Che 1993). Many models 
have been put up with, while few studies take irra-
tionality of the decision-makers into consideration.
As we have stated above, prospect theory is cur-
rently a main descriptive theory of decision under 
uncertainty. It generalizes expected utility by in-
troducing nonlinear decision weighting and loss 
aversion. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed 
prospect theory which explained the major viola-
tions of expected utility theory in choices between 
risky prospects with a small number of outcomes. 
Since then, a great many studies have been con-
ducted on prospect theory. Rank dependent ex-
pected utility (Quiggin 1981, 1982) and cumulative 
prospect theory (Tversky, Kahneman 1992) are the 
two main extension forms of the original prospect 
theory (Kahneman, Tversky 1979). Additionally, 
the third-generation prospect theory (Schmidt 
et al. 2008) extends cumulative prospect theory by 
allowing reference points to be uncertain. Prefer-
ence is well considered in decision under prospect 
theory. Prospect theory has been applied to many 
fields, such as finance, management, investment, 
etc. With prospect theory, we can gain the most 
probable bidding price a participant may take in 
a specific auction. Among the studies that have 
been conducted on prospect theory, we notice that 
multi-attribute have been considered into CPT, 
which is useful for us to analyze decision problem 
in multi-attribute auctions. Furthermore, studies 
on reference points are few but are necessary that 
we will state in the paper later.
Though many studies on bidding prices are con-
ducted using game theory, there are some stud-
ies applying prospect theory to auction decisions. 
Cheng et al. (2011) applied Fuzzy Preference Rela-
tions (FPR) and Cumulative Prospect Theory into 
bidding decision for construction company which 
is different from our paper, because we consider 
three situations that a bidder would encounter. Ar-
mantier and Treich (2009) interpreted overbidding 
in first-price auctions using probability weighting 
function. Xiong and Zhang (2008) discussed the 
influence on the bidding decision made by loss 
aversion. Davis et al. (2011) obtained the optimal 
reserve prices of auctioneers using probability 
weighting function. Wu et al. (2009) utilized pros-
pect theory to study the interrelationship among 
the elements embraced in online auction strategy, 
and stated the influences on the online bidder sat-
isfaction. Ratan (2010) explored the implications 
of reference-dependent preferences in sealed-bid 
auctions using prospect theory. And he developed 
a prospect theory based model to explain bidding 
in first-price auctions. The difference between our 
work and the previous work is that we will try 
to establish different decision models while two or 
more auctions involved and we will try to solve 
different decision problems in these land auction 
models with prospect theory.
In this paper, we aim at making decisions for 
participants in land auctions using prospect theo-
ry. Before the specific problems, we would like to 
give some preliminaries of prospect theory, which 
will be applied to solve our land auction problems.
3. PRELIMINARIES
3.1. Cumulative prospect theory
Cumulative prospect theory (CPT) was proposed 
by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Different from 
the classical theory, CPT adopts a concave-shaped 
utility function (UF) for gains and convex for loss-
es and an inverse S-shaped probability weighting 
function (PWF) to describe individual preferences 
for choosing between risky prospects.
Considering a prospect P(x1, p1; ...; xn, pn), with 
outcomes x1≥ … ≥ xk ≥ 0 > xk+1 ≥ … ≥ xn that are 
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associated with probability p1, ... , pk, pk+1, ... , pn. 
Cumulative prospect theory predicts that people 
will choose prospects based on the value of the 
prospect, which is as follows:
 . (1)
In this formula, u(x) is the utility function, 
while π is the decision weighting function. In CPT 
the utility function u(x) is the same with the one 
in the original PT, which is concave for gains and 
convex for losses, with the loss function assumed 
to be steeper than the gain function. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992) proposed u(x) as follows (β>1):
 (2)
and x in prospect theory is the deviation from the 
reference point, which is different from the tradi-
tional expected utility theory. The decision weights 
employed in CPT are given by Tversky and Kahne-
man (1992):
 .            (3)
associated with a positive outcome, is the differ-
ence between the capacities of the events “the out-
come is  at least as good as xj” and “the outcome is 
strictly better than xj”. , associated with a nega-
tive outcome, is the difference between the capaci-
ties of the events “the outcome is at least as bad 
as xj” and “the outcome is strictly worse than xj”. 
The probability functions w+ and w– (are strict-
ly increasing functions from the unit interval into 
itself, satisfying w+(0) = w–(0) = 0, and w+(1) = 
w–(1) = 1.
3.2. Third-generation prospect theory
The third-generation prospect theory (PT3) was 
proposed by Schmidt et al. (2008). Both the origi-
nal prospect theory and cumulative prospect theo-
ry have a common limitation: the reference points 
are assumed to be certainties. If reference points 
are interpreted as endowments or status quo posi-
tions, these theories cannot be applied to problems 
in which a decision-maker is endowed with a lot-
tery and has the opportunity to sell or exchange 
it. Such problems, however, can often be seen in 
land auctions. For example, a real estate devel-
opment company is now endowed with a piece of 
land through auction, while the outcome of the 
land development has not been certain. At this 
moment another piece of land is available for bid 
in the market, would the company exchange the 
first land for the second one? In these problems 
alike, we need apply PT3 to predict the compa-
ny’s decision. In addition, PT3 has explained two 
particularly well-established and robust patterns 
of deviation from the predictions of conventional 
expected utility theory. One is that willingness-
to-accept (WTA) valuations of lotteries tend to be 
greater than willingness-to-pay (WTP) valuations 
(Knetsch, Sinden 1984; Loomes et al. 2003). The 
second deviation is preference reversal (PR).
The third generation prospect theory (PT3) was 
proposed by Schmidt et al. (2008). Consider a finite 
state space S, consisting of the states Si, ... , Sn, 
and a set of consequences X given by an interval of 
the real line. Each state Si has an objective prob-
ability pi ≥0, . Act is defined as an as-
signment of consequences to states of the world. F 
is the set of all acts. A particular act f∈ F is a func-
tion from S to X, i.e. an act f specifies for each state 
Si the resulting consequence f(si)∈ X. A stochastic 
reference point is modeled as a particular act, the 
reference act h. For any state of the world S, we 
use f(si) and h(si) to denote the outcomes of act f 
and act h in state Si. Rank the values of u(f(si), 
h(si)). The “gain” states are those for which f(s) – 
h(s) are positive. And “loss” states are negative.
The value of prospect in PT3 is obtained as follows:
. (4)
u(f(si), h(si)) is a relative value function. π(si; f, h) 
is the decision weight assigned to state Si when f is 
being evaluated from h. Schmidt et al. (2008) have 
stated π(si; f, h) in (5). First, let m+ be the num-
ber of states in which there are weak gains and 
let m– = n – m+ be the number of states in which 
there are strict losses. Then, reassign subscripts so 
that, for all subscripts i, j, we have i>j if and only 
if u(f(si), h(si)) ≥u(f(sj), h(sj)) , and so that the states 
with weak gains are indexed m+, ...,1, while the 
states with strict losses are indexed –1, ..., –m–.
 
(5)
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w+ and w− are probability weights for gain states 
and loss states respectively.
3.3. Additive utility function in cumulative 
prospect theory
Multi-attribute decision making problems have 
been studied by many researchers. And they have 
proposed many different methods to solve multi-at-
tribute decision making problems (Zavadskas et al. 
2008; Liu 2009; Stankevičienė, Mencaitė 2010; Fan 
et al. 2013). However, in this paper, we would solve 
multi-attribute decision making problems with pros-
pect theory. Actually several authors have identi-
fied the preference conditions that allow decompos-
ing multi-attribute utility functions into additive, 
multiplicative and related decompositions (Farqu-
har 1975; Fischer et al. 1986; Keeney, Raiffa 1993). 
Most of these decomposition results were derived 
under expected utility. Abundant evidence exists, 
however, that expected utility is not valid as a de-
scriptive theory of decision under uncertainty while 
prospect theory can well describe the decision.
In this sense, additive utility function in pros-
pect theory was proposed by Bleichrodt et al. 
(2009). Now we review additive utility function in 
CPT, which is also known as the attribute-specific 
evaluation (Bleichrodt et al. 2009).
The attribute-specific evaluation interprets ref-
erence-dependence for each attribute separately. 
Denote the reference point on the first attribute 
by r1 and the reference point on the second one by 
r2. C = C1×C2 is a product of two non-degenerate 
convex subsets of real line. Outcomes in C will be 
denoted as x = x1x2 or as x1x2 for short. In what 
follows, the index i will refer to the attributes, and 
the index j to the states of nature. Hence fji de-
notes the i-th attribute of the outcome that is ob-
tained under state j with act f. A function U: C→ 
R is additive, if U: x→U1(x1) + U2(x2)  where Ui is 
a real-valued function on Ci, i = 1, 2 (Bleichrodt 
et al. 2009).
A prospect f is rank-ordered if f1> … >fn. For 
each prospect, there exist permutations ρ1 and 
ρ2, such that fρ1(1)1 > … > fρ1(n)1 and fρ2(1)2 > … > 
fρ2(n)2. Let Pρ1 = f ∈ P: fρ1(1)1 > … > fρ1(n)1 . That is, 
Pρ1 is the set of all prospects where outcomes are 
rank-ordered by ρ1. Pρ2 is defined similarly. Using 






 and  are 
the rankings of the outcome on the first attribute 
and the second attribute respectively.  The functions 
U1 and U2 are strictly increasing and continuous 
satisfying U1(r1) = U2(r2) = 0. The decision weights 
 and  are the decision weights for gains and 
losses for the first attribute.  and  are the 
decision weights for gains and losses for the second 
attribute.  and  are the weighting functions 
for gains and losses for the first attribute.  and 
 are the weighting functions for gains and losses 
for the second attribute. The utility functions are 
joint ratio scales and the attribute weighting func-
tions are unique. In the attribute-specific evalua-
tion, the weighting functions may differ across the 
two attributes (Bleichrodt et al. 2009). So do the 
utility functions.
3.4. Reference-point prediction
Another key factor in prospect theory is refer-
ence point. Empirical studies over the past 25 
years corroborate that subjects are highly affected 
by reference points. Reference dependence has 
a long-standing tradition in psychology and was 
transferred to behavioral economics with prospect 
theory. In economic behavior, decision makers 
seem to derive utility not from their current state 
of wealth, but from changes in wealth relative to 
some reference (Camerer 2000). Reference points 
matter in auctions because of the disposition ef-
fect: decision-maker experience resistance to sell 
at a loss and to hold on at a gain. The disposition 
effect is explained by the reflection effect of pros-
pect theory (Barberis, Xiong 2009).
In this section, we review a parsimonious for-
mula of reference point prediction. A parsimonious 
.(6)
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formula to predict reference points proposed by 




This formula allows for a built-in profit ρ but 
restrict the sum of weights to one. Built-in profit 
in this formula possibly reflects some expecta-
tion about the future. Baucells et al. (2011) pro-
posed that subjects weight past information in a 
similar way to how they weight probabilities in a 
rank-dependent model (Tversky, Kahneman 1992). 
The “natural” weights for past information is 1/n, 
i.e. equal weighting of each piece of information. 
Baucells et al. (2011) conducted research on the ref-
erence point prediction in behavioral finance, and 
the transformation from 1/n to πn,i works as fol-
lows. Firstly, accumulate the natural weights using 
the ordering of the time line, from more distant to 
more recent, yielding i/n, i = 1, … , n. This is in 
contrast to cumulative prospect theory for gains, 
where outcomes are ordered from highest to lowest. 
Next, transform the cumulative weights by means 
of a weighting function, producing w(i/n), i = 1, …, 
n. A weighting function, w, is any continuous and 
increasing function from the unit interval into the 
unit interval, with w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1. Finally, 
given a weighting function w, a built-in profit ρ, 
and a sequence of n prices, the formula they pro-
posed to predict the reference point is:
. (10)
We can see that the reference point is deter-
mined by three factors: built-in profit, weighting 
function and the value of y. Furthermore, in this 
prediction, w has the same features with the prob-
ability weighting function in prospect theory. This 
means the value of y1 and yn will influence the 
value of rn+1 most.
In the following sections, we would solve sev-
eral decision problems, which are our main work. 
All of these bidding decisions are independent for 
solution. These decision problems would be solved 
by prospect theory.
4. LAND AUCTION BIDDING PRICE 
DECISIONS USING PROSPECT THEORY
Many studies have been conducted on bidding strat-
egies. However, most of the studies are based on 
only one auction. Actually, there is not always just 
one auction available in most cases. Two or more 
auctions are available and the available auctions 
might appear at the same moment or different. 
Here, we will consider the decision-making prob-
lems in which there are two or more auctions for 
bid, and we call these auctions as the first auction, 
Fig. 1. Three situations of these two auctions
Situation 1: Simultancous auctions
Situation 2: Time-sequential auctions






Land auctions 1, 2, 3 are proposed 
outcome of the land development appearing
outcome of the land development appearing
outcome of the land development appearing
outcomes of the three plots of 
land development appearing
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the second auction, the third, ..., respectively. Ac-
cording to the appearing time of the auctions, there 
are three situations that a participant might en-
counter. Thus, we will build three decision models 
according to the three situations. In China, the 
land’s bidding price has reached to a very high lev-
el. With the high price, many real estate companies 
have no enough fund to bid for many land auctions. 
Generally, a small real estate company can only bid 
for one or two land auctions at the same time for 
its limited financing condition and the high land 
bidding prices, despite the government may launch 
many land auctions at the same time. Thus in the 
first situation and the second situation, we consid-
er two land auctions, while in the third situation, 
we consider four land auctions. The details of such 
three situations are discussed in the below and also 
depicted in Figure 1.
1. The first situation is that the two auctions are 
available at the same time. In this situation, 
the decision-maker should make the bidding 
price for both of the auctions at the same time 
without knowing the outcomes of the auctions. 
We call the situation as Simultaneous auctions.
2. The second situation is that the two auctions 
are available at different time. That is, the sec-
ond auction is proposed after the first auction 
has been sold out, but before the development 
outcome of the first auction is known. In this 
situation, the decision-maker has to decide 
whether to abandon the first auction or not. 
Meanwhile, he or she should decide the accept-
able price to abandon the first auction. Further-
more, the optimal psychological bidding price 
for the second auction should be determined by 
the decision-maker if he decides to rebid for the 
second auction. We call the situation as Time-
sequential auctions.
3. The third situation is that four auctions are 
available at different time. However, the forth 
auction is proposed after the outcomes of the 
previous three auctions have been known. In 
this situation, the bidding price for the fourth 
auction should be determined. And intuitively, 
we predict that the previous outcomes would 
have influence on the bidding price of the ap-
proaching auction. We call the situation as: 
Event-sequential auctions.
It should be noted that in the case of Situation 
3, the event-sequential auctions mean that the four 
auctions are available at different time, and the 
forth auction is proposed after the outcomes of the 
previous three auctions have been known. That is, 
after knowing the outcomes of the first three auc-
tions as a whole, we try to calculate the reference 
point on the basis of the total outcomes of the first 
three auctions, and also anticipate the outcome 
of the fourth auction. The outcome of the fourth 
auction with the reference point is determined by 
the first three auctions. This is the reason why the 
event-sequential auction situation still have two 
phases despite there are four auctions in it.
4.1. Identifying the key influential factors in 
land bidding decision
Before we apply prospect theory to analyze these 
three situations, we need firstly identify the key 
influential factors in the land bidding decision. 
The influential factors for construction company 
bidding decision have been studied by many re-
searchers (Cheng et al. 2011). Cheng et al. (2011) 
gave a summary of 44 factors identified in the lit-
erature as affecting bid/no bid decision making for 
construction companies. And these factors were 
incorporated into a questionnaire and sent to the 
bidders.  The bidders were asked to assign an im-
portance score to each factor on a scale from 1 to 9. 
The higher the score was, the more important the 
factor was felt by the bidder. Cheng et al. (2011) 
conducted the survey and described those factors 
which have received average score of importance 
equal to or greater than 5 in Table 1.
Table 1. Key influential factors in the bidding decision
Category Factor
Project Project size
Resources Experience for similar project
Company Need for work
Current workload




In China, the real estate companies would 
compete in land auctions which are launched by 
the government. Generally, in land auctions, the 
land auction’s winner is the bidder who bids at the 
highest price. If a real estate company gains the 
land from the auction, the real estate company will 
select one or more construction companies to com-
plete the building on the land by providing funds 
and other necessaries. Usually the selections of 
construction company for a real estate company 
should consider not only the bidding price but also 
the construction quality, the construction time 
and the construction company’s reputation, and 
other more. Such bidding process is usually com-
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pleted by comprehensive evaluations rather than 
auctions. In this sense,  the ultimate  evaluating 
standards  of  a  land  auction  is  usually  simpler 
than  that  of  the construction  bidding.  
Considering the key common factors for both 
the real estate company and the construction com-
pany bidding, the factors in Table 1 can also be 
used to forecast the bidding decision for a real es-
tate company in land auction. Both the real estate 
company and the construction company would con-
sider project size which would influence the profit 
and risk. Meanwhile, the company’s workload and 
experience would influence the bidding decision of 
both the real estate company and the construction 
company. Furthermore, the market is a key fac-
tor both in estate company’s bidding decision and 
construction company’s bidding decision.
Furthermore, there are some other factors 
which would influence the bidding decision in a 
land auction for the real estate company. In China, 
the real estate companies are faced with increas-
ing risk for the extremely high land price and strict 
land auction policy. Thus, the real estate compa-
nies are under pressure and take risk because of 
the high demand for development funds. Once the 
cash flow chain is broken, the real estate company 
would be faced with threat of bankruptcy. In fact, 
for a real estate company, the predicted develop-
ment time of project would influence the predicted 
recovery of funds and thus influence the financial 
risk that the real estate company would be faced 
with. If the predicted development time is short, 
the real estate company would recover the funds in 
a short time which could reduce the financial risk, 
while long development time would lead to high 
financial risk. Just as Table 1 has listed, expected 
risk is an important factor in land bidding deci-
sion. Thus, in China, the predicted development 
time for the project would also influence the real 
estate company’s bidding decision.
These factors can be divided into two categories 
which are numerical factors (such as the estimat-
ing profit, necessary development time, competi-
tors number etc.) and non-numerical factors (such 
as the expected risk). The numerical factors would 
be considered in the models and the non-numer-
ical factors would be considered as the bidder’s 
risk preference and attitude which is described in 
prospect theory. Actually, attributes of the land 
auctions are influential factors. The auctions con-
sidering the influential factors are called as multi-
attribute auctions. With the above analysis, we 
argue that the factors in Table 1 in addition to 
the predicted development time can be applied to 
a real estate company’s bidding decisions. Such in-
fluential factors are applied to the multi-attribute 
additive utility in the third generation of prospect 
theory.
In these factors, project size, need for work, 
number of competitors, expected profitability and 
predicted development time are numerical factors, 
while experience for similar project, overall econ-
omy and expected risk are non-numerical factors. 
In the numerical factors, expected profitability 
and predicted development time are attributes in 
our models. Project size also can be seen as an at-
tribute in our models. Actually, project size can be 
reflected in predicted profit and predicted develop-
ment time. Thus in our case study, we would not 
discuss the influence of project size independently 
though it is an attribute in our models. Similarly, 
need for work would also influence the predicted 
project profit and time and can be seen as an at-
tribute in our models. However, we wouldn’t con-
sider it independently in our case study. In ad-
dition, number of competitors would influence 
the probability of obtaining the land at a certain 
bidding price though it isn’t an attribute in our 
models. As to non-numerical factors, experience for 
similar project would influence the expected risk 
which would be considered in prospect theory as 
well in our models. Finally, the overall economy 
would influence the predicted profit and expected 
risk, both of which would be considered in our 
models.
4.2. Analysis of simultaneous auctions
Simultaneous auctions mean that the two auctions 
are available at the same moment. Meanwhile, all 
the bidders do not know the other participants’ bid-
ding prices. That is to say, the auctions here are 
the first-price sealed auctions. Then the decision-
maker should make the bidding prices for both of 
the auctions at the same time without knowing the 
outcomes of the auctions and other participants’ 
bidding prices. And the optimal bidding price is 
restricted by the available funds. Meanwhile the 
optimal bidding prices are determined by the val-
ues of the auctions.
To be convenient, we here refer to the first 
land and the second land as land 1 and land 2 
respectively. Since the numbers of participants 
competing in these two auctions have been known 
by all of the participants, n1 and n2 represent the 
amount of participants competing in auctions of 
land 1 and land 2 respectively. Bidding prices for 
land 1 satisfy probability density function f1, and 
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bidding prices for land 2 satisfy probability density 
function f2. The distribution function of f1 is F1. 
And the distribution function of f2 is F2.
Here the price measuring unit is million dol-
lars. And the time measuring unit is month. In 
China, the government selects the bidder with the 
highest bidding price as the winner of the auction. 
We have noticed some land auctions in China set 
a highest price bound, and the the bidding price 
above such bound regarded as invalid. This can 
avoid the increase of house prices. In this paper, 
we suppose the bidding prices are all below the 
highest price. Thus all the bidding prices are valid.
For land 1, there are n states, denoted as sk, 
k = 1, …, n. And we set sn as the failure state in 
which the company fails to obtain land 1 in the 
first auction.  Similarly, for land 2, there are m 
states, denoted as sk', k = 1, …, m. Meanwhile we 
set sm as the failure state in which the company 
fails to obtain land 2 in the second auction.
Each state involves a attributes which can be 
denoted as l, l = 1, …, a In fact, every attribute is 
a numerical factor which would influence the bid-
der’s bidding price.
We denote x1 as this company’s bidding price 
for land 1 and x2 for land 2. Other information is 
as follows:
V1 denotes the value that the company can ob-
tain from land 1. V2 denotes the value that the 
company can obtain from land 2. R1 denotes the 
reference point for land 1.
R2 denotes the reference point for land 2.
λl denotes the loss aversion coefficient for at-
tribute vl, l = 1, …, a.
ul is the utility function for attribute v of land 
1, l = 1, …, a. ul' is the utility function for attribute 
v of land 2, l = 1, …, a.
 and  are the decision weights for gains 
and losses for attribute vl of land 1, l = 1, …, a. 
 and  are the decision weights for gains 
and losses for attribute vl  of land 2, l = 1, …, a. 
and  are the weighting functions for gains 
and losses for attribute vl of land 1, l = 1, …, a. 
and  are the weighting functions for gains 
and losses for attribute vl  of land 2, .l = 1, …, a.
pk is the probability of state sk for land 1. The 
probability of winning land 1 is , and the 
probability of the state sk if land 1 has been obtained 
is 1/(n – 1). Thus , k = 
1, …, n –1, while . .
pk' is the probability of state sk' for land 2. The prob-
ability of winning land 2 is , and the prob-
ability of the state sk' if land 2 has been obtained is 
1/(m – 1). Thus , k = 1, 
…, m –1 while .
The first situation we will solve is the one that 
the first land auction and the second land auction 
are available at the same moment and the compa-
ny would decide the bidding prices for both of the 
two auctions at this moment with a limited funds.
The values here can be obtained from (6) which 
involves additive utility function in CPT. Consid-
ering the states sk for land 1, we can obtain the 
value of land 1: 
 . (11)
Considering the states sk for land 2, we can ob-
tain the value of land 2:
  (12)
with:
Thus the decision-maker would choose the op-
timal x1 and x2 at which the valuation of V1 + V2 
hits the largest.
Notice that the ranking of outcomes on a cer-
tain attribute has no relationship with the ranking 
of outcomes on the other attribute. Furthermore, 
the ranking of outcomes about land 1 has no con-
nection to the ranking of outcomes about land 2. 
Optimal x1 and x2 reflect the optimal bidding price 
that the bidder would offer for land 1 and land 2. 
Because in optimal x1 and x2, the bidder would get 
the largest value from these two auctions.
This model could be extended to more than two 
land auctions. For the nth land auction n>2, the 
value Vn can be described as:
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  (13)
with:
Then the decision-maker would choose the op-
timal x1, x2, … xn for land 1, land 2,..., land n, at 
which the valuation of V1 + V2 + … + Vn  hits the 
largest.
4.3. Analysis of time-sequential auctions
Time-sequential auctions mean that the two auc-
tions are available at different time. The second 
auction is proposed after the first auction has been 
sold but before the development outcome of the 
first auction is known. And the available money 
is not enough to support the bidder to participant 
in the second land auction. In this situation, the 
decision-maker has to decide whether to exchange 
the first auction for the second or not.
In this situation the decision-maker would 
decide the acceptable price to abandon the first 
auction. That is to say, the WTA (willingness-to-
accept) valuation of the first auction should be 
determined. The WTA valuation is the increment 
wealth such that the owner of land 1 is indifferent 
between retaining it and giving up it in exchange 
for the certainty of that increment (Schmidt et al. 
2008).
Before we obtain the WTA value of the first 
auction, we should firstly calculate the optimal 
bidding price  for land 1 and we suppose at this 
price the company has won the first land. Accord-
ing to (12), we can obtain the optimal . Thus  
is the valuation of x1 that makes V1 hit the largest 
value.
In this situation, the bidder is considering 
whether to give up land 1, and then the first prob-
lem is the lowest selling price of land 1 which the 
company is willing to accept.
The WTA valuation of land 1, denoted as zcl, is 
the increment wealth such that the owner of land 
1 is indifferent between retaining it and giving 
up it in exchange for the certainty of that incre-
ment. The reference act, denoted as h, is the act 
of holding land 1. Accordingly, we define zcl as the 
certain payoff of some constant act g defined such 
that V1(g, h) = 0.
Note that the traditional WTA valuation only 
takes one attribute into account, which is mone-
tary outcome. However, it is worth noting that in 
this paper a attributes are considered when calcu-
lating WTA valuation.
To avoid directly solving the problem that 
whether the company would abandon land 1 and 
rebid for land 2, we turn now to another problem 
that at which bidding price for land 2 the company 
would obtain the maximum value if the company 
has decided to exchange land 1 for land 2.
In order to solve this decision problem, we now 
study additive utility functions in PT3 which in-
volves multi-attribute decision problems and takes 
exchanging decision into consideration. In fact, ad-
ditive utility function in PT3 can be obtained from 
the extension of the additive function in CPT.
Based on the additive utility function in CPT, 
now we try to acquire additive utility function in 
PT3.
The reason why additive utility function in PT3 
needs to be deduced is that it can help us to ana-
lyze the participants’ bidding strategies when the 
outcome of the first land is uncertain. That is to 
say, in this situation the real estate company has 
been endowed with the first land, however the out-
come of the first land development project is under 
uncertainty. At this moment another land auction 
is available to the public.  And we would study on 
whether this company will give up the first land 
and rebid for the second land since the company’s 
available funds are limited.
According to PT3 and the additive utility in 
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 (16)
For each f(s) – h(s), there exist permutations ρl 
for attribute vl, l = 1, …, a, such that ρl satisfies 
. 
As a matter of convenience, we write 
 instead of . 
In this formula,   denotes the l-th 
attribute of the outcome which is obtained under 
state j with act f substituting for reference act h.
The function ul is strictly increasing and contin-
uous satisfying ul(f(sj) – h(sj)) =0 if the attribute vl 
of the outcome that is obtained under state j with 
act f is equal to the attribute vl obtained under the 
same state with act h. The decision weights  
and  are the decision weights for gains and 
losses for attribute vl, l = 1, …, a.  and  are 
the weighting functions for gains and losses for at-
tribute vl, l = 1, 2, …, a.
Additive utility function in PT3 extends the addi-
tive utility function in CPT. By additive utility func-
tion in PT3, we can analyze exchanging decision in 
auctions which involve more than one attribute.
Many decision situations involve outcomes that 
consist of several attributes. In applied decision 
analysis, it is useful to decompose the utility func-
tion over these multi-attribute outcomes into sepa-
rate utility functions over the different attributes 
to reduce the number of preference elicitation. This 
is only justified if the decision-maker’s preferences 
satisfy particular assumptions. In this paper, we 
propose additive utility function under PT3. And 
we apply additive utility function to decision of 
bidding problem which is more general for solving 
decision problems without particular assumption.
Then we turn to the application of additive 
utility function in PT3 in land auctions. At the 
moment the real estate company is endowed with 
land 1 and the company treats this as her refer-
ence act, denoted as act h.
However, the company is now offered with the 
opportunity to sell land 1 and rebid for land 2. We 
denote the act of selling land 1 and rebidding for 
land 2 as act f. Suppose there are n states for land 
1 in the future if it is hold by the company and m 
natural states for land 2 in the future if the com-
pany decides to rebid for land 2 at the bidding price 
. Thus we can get n×m states denoted as Si(i = 1, 
…, n×m) when both land 1 and land 2 are consid-
ered simultaneously. Pi is denoted as the probabil-
ity of state Si. 
If the company obtains land 2 when rebidding 
it at the bidding price , then the probability of 
this state is . If the company fails 
to obtain land 2 when rebidding it at the bid-
ding price , then the probability of this state is 
. Then with additive utility 
under PT3, we are able to obtain the optimal valu-
ation of PT3(f, h).
The last step is to compare the optimal valua-
tion of PT3(f, h) and zero. If the former is larger 
than zero, which means that the act f has a larger 
value relative to the reference act h, then the com-
pany would exchange land 1 for land 2. Otherwise, 
the company would hold land 1.
This model can also be extended to n land auc-
tions, n>2. Suppose n = 3, which means before the 
third land auction is proposed, two land auctions 
have been obtained, however, the real estate com-
pany doesn’t known the outcomes of development. 
Thus, the real estate company is faced with four 
choices. The first is holding land 1 and land 2. The 
second is selling land 1 to rebid for land 3 while 
holding land 2. The third choice is selling land 2 
to rebid for land 3 while holding land 1. The last 
choice is selling both of land 1 and land 2 to rebid 
for land 3. We can define the following acts.
f1: holding land 1 and land 2.
f2: selling land 1 to rebid for land 3 while hold-
ing land 2.
f3: selling land 2 to rebid for land 3 while hold-
ing land 1.
f4: selling both of land 1 and land 2 to rebid for 
land 3.
Let act f1 as the reference act. Then with the 
same method, which has been said above, we can 
obtain the optimal valuations of PT3(f2, f1), PT3 
(f3, f1), PT3(f4, f1).
After we obtain the optimal valuations of 
PT3(f2, f1), PT3(f3, f1), PT3(f4, f1), we can compare 
the valuations so that we can predict the choice 
of the developer. For example, if PT3(f4, f1)>0, it 
means when the real estate developer considers 
land 1, land 2 and land 3 simultaneously, the de-
veloper is predicted to choose act f4 rather than f1. 
However, if PT3(f4, f1)>0, the developer is predict-
ed to sell both of land 1 and land 2 to rebid for land 
3. With the similar method, we can analyze and 
predict the developer’s possible choice.
When n>3, with the same analysis process, we 
can predict the developer’s possible choice. But the 
developer will face 2n–1 choices, these combination 
choices will become a computational bottleneck 
when the number of land n is some large. Consid-
ering that each land auction needs a huge amount 
of funds, and the large number of land auctions 
rarely happens in practice, we will not discuss this 
in more details.
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4.4. Analysis of event-sequential auctions
Event-sequential auctions mean that the four auc-
tions are available at different time. However, the 
forth auction is proposed after the outcomes of the 
previous three auctions have been known. In this 
situation, the bidding price for the last auction 
should be determined. And now we will explain the 
optimal bidding price for the forth auction from 
the aspect of the reference point prediction.
A mathematical understanding of how reference 
points evolve may help predict the happiness or 
satisfaction experienced while a sequence of vari-
able outcomes unfold. In terms of auctions, there 
are always more than one auction for bid. Further-
more the previous auctions’ outcomes would have 
influence on the future bidding strategy. Now we 
try to interpret this influence from the aspect of 
reference point.
We have stated the prediction of reference point 
proposed by Baucells et al. (2011) which is mainly 
for the stock price in finance market. The reference 
point is determined by three factors: the built-in 
profit r, weighting function and the value of y.
However, in this paper, there are several differ-
ences from Baucells et al. (2011) while considering 
the prediction of the reference point. More specifi-
cally, we will try to interpret the reference point 
predicting formula in bidding decisions. In this sit-
uation, the real estate development company has 
received several pieces of land. Furthermore, this 
company has completed some of the development 
projects and has obtained the ultimate profits for 
these projects. We would discuss the influence that 
the previous profits would make on the company’s 
bidding price for the forthcoming land auction.
From the reference formula, we can see the 
built-in profit r which is interpreted as expecta-
tion about the future. However, in our situation, 
r reflects the real estate development company’s 
expectation to the next land without consideration 
of the profits which the company has gained from 
the previous land development. And y reflects the 
profit that the company has gained from the previ-
ous land development projects. The weight is de-
cided by the ordering of the profit. That is to say, 
both the largest profit and the smallest profit have 
a strong and significant effect on the prediction of 
reference point, which corresponds to reality and 
is understandable. And as the outcomes considered 
in this paper are of a attributes so in this paper, 
we can decompose yj into ylj for attribute vl, l = 
1, 2, …, a. Then we rank the valuations of ylj, j = 
1, …, n, for attribute vl, l = 1, 2, …, a, as the se-
quence: yl(1), yl(2), …, yl(n), from the biggest valua-
tion to the smallest. And as the outcomes consid-
ered in this paper are of a attributes, we can get a 
reference points in a attributes respectively. rn + 1,l 
is denoted as the reference point for attribute vl for 
the n+1th land.  is denoted as the weighting 
function for the prediction of rn+1,l. r can be decom-
posed into ρl, l = 1, 2, …, a. 
Thus, the predicting formulas in auctions are 
similar to the one of Baucells et al. (2011). Never-
theless some differences still exist. The predicting 
formulas can be depicted as:
 . (17)
We utilize the formulas to predict the reference 
points when the bidder is prepared to bid for the 
upcoming land auction after gaining profits from 
the previous development projects. Once we have 
known the reference point for the upcoming land 
auction, we would be able to get the optimal bid-
ding price for the upcoming land auction.
We have analyzed these three situations. In the 
simultaneous auctions, additive utility functions 
in CPT are adopted. While in time-sequential auc-
tions, additive utility functions in PT3 are used. 
Meanwhile, in event-sequential auctions, predic-
tions of reference point are applied.
In the following sections, we will solve these 
three situations with more details. And we will 




Currently there are two plots of land, both of which 
are profitable for the developers. A real estate de-
velopment company is now competing in these two 
auctions of land. This company would make a ra-
tional and scientific bidding strategy, from which 
this company would acquire maximum value. The 
available fund a company is limited. At present 
this company is able to afford 50 million dollars. 
Thus the manager of this company would decide 
the bidding prices for both of the two land auctions. 
Although we have given description of the factors 
that would influence the bidding decision and dis-
cussed the bidding decisions which involve several 
attributes in Section 4, in this section two land 
auction attributes the profit and the development 
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time, are discussed. They are the two main factors 
that influence the land bidding decision. Table 2 
presents the main information of the two actual 
land auctions.
Before the company submits its bidding prices 
for both of land auctions, future profit and neces-
sary development time for these two pieces of land 
have been analyzed and predicted with scientific 
methods. Obviously, a piece of land with less time 
and more predicted profit is much more beneficial 
to the company. However there exists risk because 
of the uncertainties of the product type (high-end 
or low-end), government policy, weather, market 
requirement, labor market supply and market 
competition et al. That is to say, the company could 
just predict certain outcomes with corresponding 
probabilities rather than certainty. Generally, a 
real estate company would do some predictions 
about the land’s cost, profit, and the possible de-
velopment time before it participates in the land 
auctions. For different product types, the compa-
ny would predict different profit and development 
time as the most possible profit and development 
time, respectively. Actually, if the company would 
develop high-end houses on the land, then the de-
velopment time would be longer and the estimated 
profit would be higher, while if the product type is 
low-end, then the time would be shorter and the 
profit would be lower. Thus, if the company can 
obtain these two plots of land then for each land 
the company would predict two states. 
According to the company’s research on the par-
ticipants’ previous bidding decision, the company 
can get the probability density functions ϕ1 and ϕ2 
which are as follows:
,
. (18–19)
Obviously, from the expressions, we can see ϕ1 
and ϕ2 are symmetric functions, which is intelligi-
ble for the common sense that few of the partici-
pants will bid quite low or quite high prices while 
most of them are medium prices. We can then 
obtain the probability distribution functions F1(x) 
and F2(x), which are described as follows: 
 , (20)
 . (21)
As we have stated above, if the company can 
obtain these two plots of land then for each land 
the company would predict two states. Thus for 
land 1, there are three states, denoted as s1, s2, 
s3 respectively. s1 and s2 represent two different 
states for two different product types and s3 rep-
resents that the company loses the land auction. 
Similarly, for land 2, there are also three states, 
denoted as  s1′, s2′, s3′ respectively. And here we set 
R1 as (30 months, 0), while R2 (15 months, 0). Also 
we suppose the valuations of the second attribute 
(i.e. profit) in all the states are not less than 0.
Briefly, here we adopt the utility function and 
probability weighting function in cumulative pros-
pect theory, both for the first attribute and the sec-
ond attribute. Nonetheless, the parameters in the 
functions are not the same for the first attribute 
and the second attribute. Here we suppose that pa-
rameters of u1 and w1 are obtained from Tversky 
and Kahneman (1992), while parameters of u2 and 
w2 are obtained from Abdellaoui (2000) which has 
the similar approach to Cheng et al. 2011. We set 
u1′, u2′, w1′, w2′ satisfying: u1′ = u1, u2′ = u2, w1′ = 
w1, w2′ = w2:
Table 2. Two land auctions
(Item) land 1 land 2
Project Housing project Housing Project
Total floor area 68093 square meters Total floor area 56554 square meters
Basement area 5489 square meters Basement area 4236 square meters
Location Bingjiang Zone, Hangzhou city, China Yuhang Zone, Hangzhou city, China
Competitor number 10 5
Bidding system Open competitive bid Open competitive bid
Fund self and bank self and bank
Product high-end or low-end high-end or low-end






We set the limited fund as 50 million dollars. Thus 
x1+ x2 £ 50. Each state of land 1 and land 2 can be 
described as follows.
land 1:
(1)s1: (time, profit) = (25 months, 30 – x1); 
,
(2)s2: (time, profit) = (35 months, 10 – x1); 
,
(3)s3: (time, profit) = (0, 0); 
.
land 2:
(1)s1′: (time, profit) = (15 months, 25 – x2); 
;
(2)s2′: (time, profit) = (20 months, 20 – x2); 
;
(3)s3′: (time, profit) = (0, 0);
.
With additive utility under CPT, we are able to 
obtain the utilities of land 1 and land 2, which we 
are denoted as V1 and V2:
,
.
Then the company would make a decision of x1 
and x2, which can give the company the maximum 
valuation of V1+V2. And it can be predicted by 
the following optimization problem with the con-
straints that the profits of all states are not less 
than 0:
max V = V1 + V2
s.t. x1 + x2 ≤ 50
 30 – x1 ≥ 0
 10 – x1 ≥ 0
 25 – x2 ≥ 0
 20 – x2 ≥ 0
 x1, x2 ≥ 0. (26)
According to the ranking of the outcomes of 




According to the ranking of the outcomes of 
land 2 on the first attribute, we can get:
,
.
According to the ranking of the outcomes of 
land 1 on the second attribute we can get:
,
.
According to the ranking of the outcomes of 
land 2 on the second attribute we can get:
,
.
The optimal solution of this problem is x1* = 8.5, 
x2* = 10.7, max V1* = 19.9471. This means the com-
pany would probably bid for land 1 at 8.5 million 
dollars and bid for land 2 at 10.7 million dollars, 
for at these bidding prices the company would ob-
tain the highest value of 30.8025.
5.3. Time-sequential auctions
The situation discussed in this section is independ-
ent from the situation discussed in the above sec-
tion. In this situation, only land 1 is for bid at pre-
sent. Similarly, the manager would make decision 
on the bidding price for land 1. With the additive 
function in CPT, we can obtain the utility of land 
1 (i.e. V1):








Then we would maximize the valuation of V1 
with the constraints that the profits in all states 
are not less than 0, which can be depicted as the 
follows:
max V1 
s.t. 30 – x1 ≥ 0
 10 – x1 ≥ 0
 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 50. (27)
The optimal solution of (27) is x1* = 8.5, V1* = 
19.9471. This means if there is just land 1 for bid, 
then the company would probably bid for land 1 
at 8.5 million dollars, at which the company would 
obtain the highest value of 19.9471 from land 1.
Assume land 1 has been offered to the real es-
tate company at the payment of the bidding price 
calculated above (i.e. x1*). That is to say, at the mo-
ment the company is endowed with land 1. How-
ever, soon after the company won land 1 from the 
auction, the government announces that land 2 is 
available. The auction for land 2 is begun now. In 
this situation, the real estate company is consider-
ing whether to give up land 1 and rebid for land 
2 for the rest available funds couldn’t support the 
company to bid for land 2.
Table 3. WTA Valuation of land 1
0.5 0.5
h (25,30 − x1*) (35,10 −x1*)
g (0, zcl) (0, zcl)
The situation is depicted by the following ma-
trix (in which the columns are states, with prob-
abilities shown at the top, the rows are acts, and 
the entries in the cells are consequences).
According to the definition of WTA valuation, 
we set V(g, h) = 0 to get the valuation of zcl, i.e. the 
WTA valuation of land 1.
. . 
Thus, zcl = 2.86348. This means the company’s 
lowest acceptable selling price for land 1 is 2.86348 
million dollars. Obviously, attribute 1 (time) has 
influence on the WTA valuation. Therefore, the 
WTA valuation is unequal to the traditional one 
in which only one attribute is involved.
There are two natural states for land 1 in the 
future if it is hold by the company, i.e. (25,30 – 
x1*) and (35,10 – x1*). And there are three natu-
ral states for land 2 in the future if the company 
decides to rebid for land 2 at bidding x2*, i.e. (0, 
zcl), (15,25 + zcl – x2*) and (20,20 + zcl – x2*). Thus 
we can get 6 states when both land 1 and land 
2 are considered simultaneously. The analysis is 
described in the Table.
Table 4. Six states of the two land auctions
States h(Si) f (Si) f (Si) − h(Si) Pi
S1 (25, 30 – x1*) (0, zcl) (–25,–18.7) 0.5(1 – F2 4(x2*)) 
S2 (25, 30 – x1*) (15,25 + zcl – x2*) (–10, 6.3 − x2*) 0.5F24(x2*)  × 0.5
S3 (25, 30 – x1*) (20,20 + zcl – x2*). (–5, 1.3 − x2*) 0.5F24(x2*) × 0.5
S4 (35,10 – x1*) (0, zcl), (–35,–1.3) 0.5(1 − F24 (x2*) 
S5 (35,10 – x1*) (15,25 + zcl – x2*) (–20, 26.3 − x2 ) 0.5 F24 (x2*) × 0.5
S6 (35,10 – x1*) (20,20 + zcl – x2*). (–15, 21.3 − x ) 0.5 F24 (x2*) × 0.5
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State S1 is the composite of (25, 30 – x1*) and 
(0, zcl) which means that if land 1 is hold the out-
come might be (25, 30 – x1*), however if land 1 is 
sold and the company rebids for land 2 the out-
come could be (0, zcl). Similarly, we can explain the 
rest states from S2 to S6. Note that the profit of 
land 2 in state S1 and S4 is zcl. It is because that 
if land 1 is sold, the company will obtain zcl equal-
ing to the WTA valuation of land 1 and we suppose 
that the company would make x2* as her bidding 
price for land 2. Therefore, if the company fails to 
acquire land 2 at the bidding price x2*, he can still 
get zcl, the price at which he has sold land 1. x1* 
in the form is the optimal solution we get at the 
beginning in 5.3.( x1* =8.5). It means that the com-
pany bided for land 1 at x1*. zcl is the valuation we 
have obtained in 5.3.1(zcl = 2.86348). And from the 
table, we can see x2 < 26.3. With additive utility 
under PT3, we are able to obtain V(f, h). When we 
rank the valuation of f(Si) – h(Si), the value of x2* 
will have influence in the ranking of the outcomes 
in the second attribute. So we would discuss the 
intervals that x2* might fall into.
When 26.3 < x2* < 50,
, 
when 25 < x2* < 26.3,
, 
when 21.3 ≤ x2* ≤ 25,
, 
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, 








when 1.3 < x2* ≤ 6.3,




when 0 < x2* ≤ 1.3,
. 
From the curve of the piecewise function, we 
can find it is monotonous increasing. Thus, the 
optimal valuation of x2 is 50 and the optiaml valu-
ation of V(f, h) is –11.0189 which is smaller than 
zero. Thus the company wouldn’t abandon land 1 
and rebid for land 2.
5.4. Event-sequential auctions
As we have mentioned, in this situation, there are 
four land auctions. The four auctions are available 
at different time. The forth auction is proposed af-
ter the development outcomes of the previous three 
auctions have been certain. In this situation, the 
company has experienced profits of the previous 
three land development projects. And the company 
is now trying to bid for the forth land auction. Now 
we consider the influence of previous profits on the 
next land auction’s bidding price decision.
Suppose that the previous outcomes are as fol-
lows: (25 months, 18), (20 months, 15), (30 months, 
22). Now we would predict the reference point of 
the next bidding. As we have stated, the reference 
point of the next bidding can be described as (10). 
And as the outcomes considered here are of two 
attributes, we can get two reference points in two 
attributes, which are denoted as r4,1 and r4,2. Ac-
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In (28) and (29), we denote the exponential 
functions as wr4,1 and wr4,2. Thus the predicted 
reference point can describe the following charac-
teristic: the best and the worst outcome will have a 
strong and significant effect on the reference point. 
We take the following formula which has been pro-
posed by Baucells et al. (2011) with wr4,1 = wr4,2 = 
, ρ1 = ρ1 = 5.2. According to (28) 
and (29), we can obtain the r4,1 = 28.045, r4,2 = 
25.1818. This means the reference point for the 
forth land of the first attribute is 28.045, and the 
reference point for the forth land of the second at-
tribute is 25.1818. The reference points will make 
influence on the forthcoming bidding price deci-
sion, and the calculation process is similar to the 
solutions in Sections 5.2 and 5.3. Thus we wouldn’t 
discuss the specific calculation process again.
6. CONCLUSIONS
We have discussed bidding strategies when two 
or more land auctions are involved. We studied 
the three situations a bidder would probably be 
faced with when two or more land auctions are 
considered: the simultaneous situation, the time 
sequential situation and the event sequential situ-
ation. In addition to influential factor analysis, all 
the land auctions model are constructed as multi-
attribute auctions, which is more in line with the 
reality. Then, we applied the prospect theory to 
predict bidding strategies, taking individual pref-
erence into account.
In the simultaneous auctions, the additive util-
ity functions in cumulative prospect theory (CPT) 
are utilized to solve the bidding decisions, when 
two auctions of land are available at the same mo-
ment. The optimal bidding prices are obtained for 
both of the two auctions with a limited available 
fund. In the time-sequential auctions, additive 
utility function in PT3 is used when two auctions 
are available at different time. The decision-maker 
has been endowed with the first land but without 
knowing the ultimate outcome of the first land. To 
predict the choice of the company, we supposed the 
company would abandon the first land and rebid 
for the second, then we predicted the most possible 
bidding price that the company would rebid for the 
second land. We discussed willingness-to-accept 
(WTA) valuation of the first land when two attrib-
utes are considered and applied the additive utility 
function in third-generation prospect theory (PT3) 
to solve this problem. In the event-sequential auc-
tions, the prediction of reference point is applied 
to bidding strategies. We used the predicted ref-
erence point to solve the bidding strategies when 
the outcomes of the previous auctions are known. 
By calculating the reference point for the upcom-
ing auction, the optimal bidding price for the up-
coming auction can be obtained. A case study in 
Hangzhou, China is used to show the real estate 
company’s land auction bidding decision process 
and the final optimal solutions are obtained using 
our proposed prospect-theory based land auction 
bidding decision model.
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